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STANDARDS OF PERSUASION AND THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN FACT AND LAW
Richard D. Friedman*
The invitation to respond in these pages to Gary Lawson's very in-
teresting article, Proving the Law, was tempting enough. But what made
it irresistible was Professor Lawson's comment that he is "addressing,
with a brevity that borders on the irresponsible, subjects well beyond
[his] depth." Now, that's the kind of debate I really like. Let me jump
right in.
A principal question raised by Lawson, which I find quite interest-
ing, may be phrased in general, and purposefully ambiguous, terms as
follows: Before an actor treats a proposition as a valid 2 proposition of
law, what standard of persuasion should that proposition meet-that is,
to what degree must the actor be persuaded of the merits of the proposi-
tion? This is a question that plainly might, and probably should, admit
of different answers in different circumstances. Thus, a broader meta-
question is: On what basis should a legal actor or observer determine the
standard of persuasion that a proposition should meet?
Part II of this Essay approaches this meta-question in general terms.
It concludes that only in certain circumstances is the question even co-
herent. Absent certain simplifying assumptions, it will not help the legal
actor in deciding on an optimal course of conduct to determine a single
standard of persuasion on a proposition of law in the given circum-
stances. An accurate decision requires a more complex determination of
the expected value of each possible course of conduct. The complexity of
this task may explain why, as Lawson notes, this entire matter has nearly
been overlooked; whether or not legal actors happen upon sensible ways
of dealing with uncertainty concerning the validity of legal propositions,
it is probably too difficult for them to articulate just what they are doing.
Part III offers some tentative thoughts on a narrower conundrum
presented by Lawson in the context of the criminal law. The issue may
be posed briefly as follows: Given that a criminal defendant may not be
convicted unless facts sufficient to support each element of the crime are
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan School of Law. Many thanks to Ron Allen.
I Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 859, 861 (1992).
2 "Valid" is a purposefully ambiguous term, because it has a meaning in both the descriptive
and prescriptive senses. A proposition may be descriptively valid if it accurately reflects the state of
the law. Or it may be prescriptively valid if it accurately reflects the interests that the lawmaker
believes should underlie the law.
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proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 3 is it acceptable to allow the convic-
tion to stand if the court is not persuaded to that degree that the legal
propositions underlying the conviction are valid?
Before addressing these matters, I will offer some comments in Part
I on a matter that underlies the discussion, both in Lawson's article and
in this Essay-the relation between law and fact.
I. THE LAW-FACT DISTINCTION
A. The Conceptual Distinction
According to Lawson, "the law-fact distinction.., is purely a crea-
ture of convention."'4 This, it seems to me, is an overstatement.5 There is
an analytic difference, independent of convention, between law and
fact-though it is not always a distinction that will do us much good.
Lawson speaks of "a reality that exists independently of its acknowl-
edgment by the conscious mind of a perceiver."' 6 That strikes me as a
serviceable definition of fact.
But this definition may not seem to distinguish law from fact. Law-
son argues that "[flrom an epistemological perspective, every positive
propositional claim about the law in the form 'the law is X' is a factual
claim of one sort or another."7 Lawson calls this point an "innocent"
one,8 and I suppose that it is, so long as it is limited to descriptive state-
ments of law. Without defining "descriptive statement of law" too pre-
cisely, I mean the term to cover a statement of what certain officials or
other significant actors have declared, or will declare, the law to be, or of
what their conduct has indicated, or will indicate, they believe the law to
be, or even merely of what their decisions have been, or will be, in given
situations. The matters described by such a statement may well be
deemed to be aspects of reality that exist independently of their conscious
acknowledgment by the perceiver, and so factual. But these are factual
matters of a very particular type, and usually can be distinguished from
ordinary factual questions. If, for example, a litigation concerns an acci-
dent, then the questions "What have the courts said in the past that they
would do about situations such as this," and "What are they likely do
about this one?" might be called factual. But they concern the past and
prospective conduct of legal officials in determining legal norms that may
be applied in this litigation. That is a quality absent from an ordinary
3 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
4 Lawson, supra note 1, at 863.
5 Though the following discussion takes a somewhat different approach, I believe it is substan-
tially in accord with the excellent treatment of the subject in Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229, 232-37 (1985).
6 Lawson, supra note 1, at 866.
7 Id. at 863.
8 Id.
86:916 (1992)
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factual statement such as, "What happened at the intersection of State
and Liberty?"
What we consider law does not, of course, consist only of descriptive
statements of law. Courts and other legal actors prescribe norms that
determine the consequences to be attached by social institutions to a
given state of fact. Creating those norms-answering a question such as,
"What should we, and our successors and subordinates, do about situa-
tions such as this?"-is clearly a different matter from determining what
happened at State and Liberty.
Legal propositions may be entirely descriptive, entirely prescriptive,
or somewhere in between. But wherever a particular proposition may
fall along this dimension, if it merely asserts what norms would or should
be applied to a given factual setting, it is much different in nature from a
statement asserting what that factual setting is.
Thus, the concepts of fact and law, both of which must be deter-
mined in adjudication, are distinct. We can therefore begin by thinking
of two functions that, in theory, are also distinct. The fact-finding func-
tion is to determine that part of reality that is relevant to the adjudication
of the action. We might think of this function as the reconstruction in
imagination of that portion of reality, as if making a mental film. The
law-determining function, then, is to prescribe the consequences to be
attached to that aspect of reality.
This description usually understates the complexity of the two func-
tions, however. Facts, at least disputed facts, usually cannot be deter-
mined to, or nearly to, a certainty; thus, the fact-finding function is to
reconstruct in imagination various possible accounts of the relevant por-
tion of reality, assigning a probability to each. And the law-determining
function must take this uncertainty into account, prescribing the conse-
quences not simply for a given factual state but for a given distribution of
possible factual states; put another way, the law-determining function re-
quires not only the determination of substantive norms but also the de-
termination of standards of persuasion with respect to the facts.
The fact-finding and law-determining functions could be performed
without any articulation at all, though the results would not be satisfac-
tory. If an adjudicator were allowed to act like Justice Frankfurter's
"kadi under a tree,"9 he might determine the outcome of a case without
articulating either the guiding principles or factual findings; he might
simply say, "Plaintiff shall take two cows," or "Judgment for the defend-
ant." But justice demands judgment according to principle, and fairness
and efficiency make some measure of predictability at least desirable.
The adjudicator should at least attempt to articulate the set of principles
9 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("This is a
court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing
justice according to considerations of individual expediency.").
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according to which he is deciding the case. Stating such principles, to-
gether with the outcome of the case, implies findings of facts (or, more
precisely, of probability distributions of possible facts) that, under those
principles, lead to that outcome.
B. The Burden of Articulation Imposed on the Fact Finder
The demands for articulation increase greatly if the pure fact-finding
function is given to one actor and the pure law-determining function is
given to another, for then those two actors must communicate with each
other. Imagine first that the entire burden of articulation is imposed on
the fact finder. That is, the fact finder communicates to the law deter-
miner what really happened,10 and the law determiner decides, given
those facts, what consequences to impose. Clearly, this is not a burden
that the fact finder can carry.
The fact finder may of course get the facts wrong, but that need not
trouble us here; our system tolerates a substantial probability of incorrect
fact-finding with no apparent distress. 1 A more serious problem is the
one highlighted in section A: The fact finder is unable to determine with
certainty what occurred. Thus, its report to the law determiner would
have to include a probability distribution of possible accounts. This
greatly magnifies the scope of the fact finder's task.
Another problem, even putting factual uncertainty aside, is that,
without categorizing and evaluating, the fact finder cannot possibly artic-
ulate all the separate aspects that constitute a real factual setting. If the
fact finder really could produce a movie (or a polysensual counterpart
that included smell, touch, taste, and emotion as well as sight and sound)
and present it to the law determiner, that might solve the problem. But
no fact finder composed of humans can do this. Instead, the fact finder
must rely on words.
One reason the fact finder must rely on words in its actual determi-
nation of the facts is that to a large extent it must rely on witnesses.' 2 A
witness is highly unlikely to be able to provide a demonstration of just
how slippery the road surface was, or to make a statement such as, "The
kinetic coefficient of friction of the road was 0.85." The witness' mind
10 And, in appropriate cases, what will happen (e.g., how bad the plaintiff's disability will be),
what would have happened in the past given a particular set of conditions (e.g., how much the
plaintiff would have been able to work had the accident not occurred), and what would happen in
the future given a particular set of conditions (eg., how much would the plaintiff be able to work had
the accident not occurred).
11 L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 75 (1977), seems to find this
tolerance for error unthinkable. For responses, see James Brook, The Use of Statistical Evidence of
Identification in Civil Litigation: Well-Worn Hypotheticals, Real Cases, and Controversy, 29 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 293, 319 (1985), and Richard D. Friedman, A Diagrammatic Approach to Evidence, 66
B.U. L. REv. 571, 575 n.11 (1986).
12 1 use "witnesses" here in a broad sense to include not only an in-court witness but also an out-
of-court declarant whose statement is admitted for the truth of what it asserts.
86:916 (1992)
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begins to evaluate and categorize reality as soon as her senses perceive
and her brain records that reality. 13 And, in attempting to communicate
that reality, she must again evaluate and categorize by making choices in
the use of words. Thus, instead of speaking in terms of the coefficient of
friction, she is likely to say something like, "The road was very slippery."
Even if the witness were able to speak precisely in terms of the coeffi-
cient of friction, the fact finder would probably be unable to do much
with that information-at least without translating it into terms with
which it is more familiar, such as "very slippery." And, especially if the
evidence that the fact finder receives is of the "very slippery" type, the
fact finder is unlikely to be able to be more precise in presenting its own
findings. Moreover, this problem is multiplied many-fold as the fact
finder attempts to describe not just one particular circumstance but all
aspects of a complex, dynamic situation.
In short, the limits of language and of the human mind mean inevi-
tably that articulated factual findings will be evaluative categorizations.
One problem with such categorizations might be that they include nor-
mative content-"very slippery" might mean in effect "too slippery to be
driving the way the defendant was driving." Putting that problem aside
for now, the difficulty is that such categorizations may not give the law
determiner all the information she needs. How slippery, she may ask, is
very slippery? Suppose the defendant's conduct, as described by the fact
finder, should be deemed tortious given some degrees of slipperiness that
might be considered very slippery, but not given other degrees of slipperi-
ness. The case then is indeterminate.' 4
C. The Burden of Articulation Imposed on the Law Determiner
Now consider the polar alternative: Suppose that the entire burden
of articulation is put on the law determiner. In other words, the law
determiner articulates with great specificity what facts (or, more pre-
13 See, eg., Walter W. Cook, 'Facts'and 'Statements ofFact, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 233, 238 (1937).
As one introductory psychology text comments:
[O]ur senses provide us with raw data about the external world. However, without interpreta-
tion, this raw information remains what William James (1890) called "a booming, buzzing con-
fusion."... Ultimately, it is the brain that interprets the complex flow of information from the
various senses. Using sensory information as raw material, the brain creates perceptual exper-
iences that go beyond what is sensed .... In other words, we use sensory information to create
perceptions that are more than just sums of various parts. We tend to fill in the missing infor-
mation, to group various objects together, to see whole objects and hear meaningful sounds
rather than just meaningless bits and pieces of raw sensory data.
CHARLES G. MORRIS, PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 107, 110 (7th ed. 1990).
14 One way the law determiner might respond to this problem is to assume that the fact finder
has found, or would find, the most extreme possible set of facts that could reasonably be found on
the state of the evidence. Thus, for example, a court considering a motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict will "construe the evidence and inferences most favorably to the non-moving
party." Bruno v. Western Elec. Co., 829 F.2d 957, 962 (10th Cir. 1987). This is not a happy solu-
tion; the facts hypothesized by the court may be far different from the facts found by the jury.
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cisely, what distributions of factual possibilities) will support what result,
and the fact finder, following those instructions, simply chooses the re-
sult. To model this view, one might think of every expectable combina-
tion of factual findings as a point in a field of infinite dimensions. The
law determiner must create a template that will be applied to that field,
determining the consequences for given areas-that is, for given sets of
points. A simple template would have just two areas, perhaps one
marked "Liability" and the other marked "No Liability." In a particu-
larly simple form of such a template, just one factor would separate the
two areas, at least in the range of points covering ordinarily expectable
findings. More complex templates, or rules, would often be necessary,
however, to yield acceptable results. In any event, the fact finder need
only determine in which area it believes the point representing reality
lies.
I believe this theoretical model has its appeal.15 In pure form,
though, it cannot be translated into operational reality. It might have
one advantage over the model presented in section B, in which the fact
finder does the articulation: If the law determiner is a court and the fact
finder is a jury, the former is in all probability more articulate than the
latter. This point cannot be taken too far, however; the court is unlikely
to be able to determine precisely what facts support what judgment.
Thus, the court will not be able to give instructions in the form, "If you
find that it is more likely than not that the defendant's speed, as ex-
pressed in miles per hour, divided by the coefficient of friction, was 65 or
more, and if .... " Moreover, even if the court were perfectly articulate,
the jury would still in all probability be unable to work sensibly in such
terms.
There is a further problem. Carrying the full burden of articulation
means that the court must articulate a rule indicating what the result
should be for each possible combination of facts that the jury might plau-
sibly find. If the rule depends on one or two factors, or if each factor
may be considered separately, articulating the rule so fully may not be
too difficult. In many settings, however, the task would be intractable,
requiring the court to articulate the interplay of a long series of factors
across a many-dimensional field of possible facts.
D. Resolution in Tension
In reality, then, the functions of law-determination and fact-finding
cannot be allocated in pure form. Fact finders cannot perfectly articulate
the facts that they find. Indeed, juries are not ordinarily expected to be
articulate at all. A trial court sitting without a jury is expected to articu-
15 In fact, I have been puttering intermittently for some time with an unpublished paper called A
Spatial View of Law, which I would be delighted to share with interested readers and which, among
other things, elaborates on this model.
86:916 (1992)
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late its factual findings, 16 but it may use conclusory statements to jump
the gap between its articulations of factual reality and of legal standard.
On the legal side, courts articulate generalized norms, and may attempt
to articulate more particular applications. But with respect to most, and
perhaps all, legal questions, there comes a point in the articulation of the
standard where the courts are unwilling and perhaps unable to be more
precise. When it reaches this point, a court might still impose a stan-
dard, albeit an unarticulated one.17 Sometimes, however, by using such
open-textured words as "reasonable," a court leaves to the jury the deter-
mination of the applicable standard in the particular case.
Courts might speak of a standard such as "reasonable" as a question
of fact. We should not be fooled. The jury in such a case does more than
determine an aspect of reality. It also determines the norms that will be
applied in that case.1 8 In a real sense, it makes law-but inarticulate law
that is good for the one case only.19 Thus, the courts, in stating general
principles, are the wholesalers of law, but often the retail work is done by
the jury.
Nor should we be satisfied by referring to "mixed questions of fact
and law." That term may often be accurate enough, but it is potentially
a cop out, because it can obscure the complexity of what occurs. Both
the court and the jury may have to consider legal standards and facts
simultaneously. But that does not mean that the function performed by
either lies on a continuum between fact-finding and law-determination.
Rather, there may be aspects of both fact-finding and law-determination
in the functions of both the court and the jury.
When the court decides whether the plaintiff's case is sufficient to go
to the jury, it need not determine what the actual facts are.20 It must,
however, determine whether the jury might reasonably find facts that are
sufficient to support the claim. This involves both a form of fact-finding,
16 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see generally Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing
and Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 645 (1988).
17 If the fact finder were articulate, the court could make a conclusory statement like, "On the
state of facts found, I conclude that the defendant is not liable." Given an inarticulate fact finder,
however, a court wishing to impose a standard without articulating the standard to the fact finder
must keep, or take, the case away from the fact finder. Then the conclusory statement must be
something like, "On no set of facts that could reasonably be found would the defendant be liable."
18 I am not referring here to jury nullification, which is defined in THOMAS GREEN, VERDICT
ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE (1985), as "the exercise of jury discretion in favor of a defendant
whom the jury nonetheless believes to have committed the act with which he is charged." Id at xiii.
Jury nullification is conduct in conflict with judicial instructions; I am discussing here conduct imple-
menting and supplementing those instructions.
19 Cf Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("The reason for my
concern is that the instant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring
adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and
train only.").
20 1 speak here of a civil plaintiff's case, but the same points would hold for other parties against
whom a case or issue might be decided without reaching the fact finder.
HeinOnline  -- 86 Nw. U. L. Rev.  922 1991-1992
Standards of Persuasion
at least to the extent of determining what facts might reasonably be
found, and law-determination. In an easy case, the court might not have
to perform either function very precisely. An easy case would be one in
which, on any view of the governing legal standard that the court finds
plausible, it is clear either that the jury might reasonably find facts suffi-
cient to support the plaintiff's claim, or that the jury may not so find. In
such a case the court need not, for the sake of deciding whether the case
belongs before the jury, determine just what the applicable legal standard
is, or even the bounds of what facts the jury might reasonably find. In a
harder case, the court might have to decide whether a combination of
factual findings exists that the jury might reasonably make and that satis-
fies the legal standard the court prefers-but even then, the court need
not, simply to determine whether the case is for the jury, articulate the
standard it chooses. 21 And, easy case or hard, the court need not even
determine the legal standard for purposes of instructing the jurors, if it is
satisfied to leave to them the retail work of deciding the standard for the
particular case.
When a jury is asked to resolve an issue such as the "reasonable-
ness" of the defendant's conduct, it, too, must perform both a fact-find-
ing function and a law-determining one. In an easy case, it, too, may not
need to perform either function with great precision; especially given the
jury's inarticulateness, the two functions may blur together, in that the
jury may be uncertain to what extent it is finding facts and to what extent
it is determining standards. If, for example, the jury decides that the
facts of the defendant's conduct lie within a given range, and that this
entire range lies outside any plausible view of the zone of reasonable con-
duct, then it may decide that the defendant's conduct was unreasona-
ble-without determining, much less articulating, precisely what that
conduct was or what the standard of reasonableness is. In a harder case,
the jury might have to be considerably more precise, both as to the facts
and the governing standard. But, unless the jury is required to return an
extraordinarily detailed special verdict, it need not be articulate at all.
This very lack of articulateness may indeed be attractive to the
court; to the extent the court feels comfortable leaving the determination
of the standard in the particular case to the jury, the court need not
worry whether the standard actually chosen is consistent with those ap-
plied in other cases. Of course, this inarticulateness has a very substan-
tial downside, for it may represent a partial abandonment of the goals of
predictability and of decision according to understood principles.
In some cases, there may be more positive reasons-in contrast to
the jury's black box nature-for leaving some of the task of selecting
legal standards to the jury. For one thing, where the general principle is
that prevailing community standards are to supply the norm, the jury
21 See supra note 17.
86:916 (1992)
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may be more likely than a court to act in accordance with those stan-
dards; "reasonable speed" and "ordinary care" are good illustrations.
Moreover, an efficient allocation of authority does not break down
neatly along, or even necessarily very close to, the law-fact division.
Thus, it often makes sense for general facts, which are significant across a
range of cases, to be determined at the top of the pyramid, ensuring uni-
formity and obviating the need for repeated litigation.22 And, by the
same token, it often makes sense for the particularized standard in a
given case to be determined at the bottom of the pyramid by those most
familiar with the case. Some narrow decisions of policy in most sys-
tems-political, enterprise, military, and so forth-are often made well
below the top of the pyramid, and there is no reason why the same
should not be true in judicial systems as well. Indeed, appellate courts
sometimes rather explicitly recognize the value of devolution of this sort,
by purportedly leaving certain questions to the discretion of the trial
court.23 Leaving the choice of particularized standards to the jury rather
than to the trial court accomplishes much the same efficiency benefit. It
does so, however, without pressuring the trial court, for better or for
worse, to articulate those standards and without creating the possibility,
for better or for worse, that the standard chosen will become a precedent
for future cases.
Once again, there is a substantial downside if the fact finder is too
readily granted the authority to select the governing standard. It makes
little sense for a jury, or for that matter a randomly selected trial judge,
to decide broad issues of political, economic, and social policy. Past a
point, appellate judges must ensure that, if such a policy decision is to be
made within the judicial system, they, rather than the fact finder, will
22 Thus, it is generally understood that legislative facts-facts that go to determine what the law
is-are for the courts to determine. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 201(a), advisory committee's note, 56
F.R.D. 183, 201-03 (1973). But as the statement of legal principles becomes more particularized, it
is not always easy to determine whether a given fact should be deemed adjudicative or legislative.
The difficulty may be that a court often has a choice of how to treat a given fact. For example, an
appellate court might say, "Because we believe factual propositions A through N to be true, we hold
legal proposition P to be true." On the other hand, it might hold that the trial court should instruct
the jury, "If you find that propositions A through N are true, then you should act in accordance with
legal proposition P." Either of these approaches might be appropriate in a given case; the choice will
often depend on how recurrent propositions A through N are. The work of Professors Walker and
Monahan on this general topic is very important. See, eg., Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REv. 877 (1988); Laurens
Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV.
559 (1987).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 184 (1987) ("We have recognized that the
choice of remedies to redress racial discrimination is a balancing process left, within appropriate
constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion of the trial court.") (quotation marks and
citations omitted); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) ("Reviewing courts, of course, should
grant substantial deference to ... the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted
criminals."); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) ("Theforum non conveniens
determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.").
924
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make the decision-either by articulating the governing standard with
sufficient precision or, particularly where that seems inadvisable or too
difficult, by removing the case from the fact finder.24
Thus, the allocation of authority over law and fact is the product of
various tensions. On the one hand, there is a clear analytical distinction
between law and fact, and the allocation of law determination to the
courts and fact-finding to the jury is (assuming the value of the jury in
the first place) presumptively desirable. But this allocation is impossible
to effectuate in pure form, largely because of limitations on the power of
articulation. Moreover, even if courts were articulate enough to state a
legal rule for every possible factual finding, they often would not be will-
ing to do so. And often a question, though analytically factual, is suffi-
ciently general that it is most efficiently decided by the courts, just as
some questions, though analytically legal, are sufficiently particular that
it may be best to leave decision of those questions to the fact finder.
Thus, I have no debate with the commonplace that the allocation of
authority over law and fact is in large part a matter of convention or
function. But that commonplace should not make us despair of finding
any conceptual distinction between law and fact.
II. ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE A STANDARD OF PERSUASION FOR
PROPOSITIONS OF LAW
The essence of Lawson's argument is his contention that "[flor any
given proposition in any given context, one needs a standard of proof
that expresses the total weight or magnitude of the evidence required for
a justified assertion of that proposition. '25 This requirement, he asserts,
applies to propositions of law as well as to propositions of fact; indeed, a
theory of interpretation is "radically incomplete and indeterminate" un-
less it includes a governing standard of proof.26
24 The rule of reason in antitrust provides an interesting illustration. In Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977), the Supreme Court said, "Under [the rule of reason], the
factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should
be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition."
The Court cannot have meant what it said, for that would mean that in any case decided by the
rule of reason the jury or trial court sitting without a jury would in effect adjudicate not only the
legality of the practice before it but also the entire panoply of economic, political, and social issues
that might go into determining whether the restraint on competition is "unreasonable." Not surpris-
ingly, appellate courts in cases under the rule of reason have, notwithstanding the open-ended lan-
guage of Sylvania, exercised substantial control over the fact finder, see, eg., Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 694 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1982) (on remand; affirming summary judgment for
defendant), and at times they have attempted to make more particular statements of the rule, see,
e.g., Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.)
("The plaintiff in a restricted distribution case must show that the restriction he is complaining of
was unreasonable because, weighing effects on both intrabrand and interbrand competition, it made
consumers worse off.").
25 Lawson, supra note 1, at 869.
26 Id. at 874-75.
86:916 (1992)
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In this Part, I will express partial agreement with Lawson. Section
A examines what I will call the descriptive mode, in which an actor at-
tempts to determine the validity of legal propositions according to norms
that already have been, or will be, established by other actors. I will
begin with a simple model. Given the restrictions of that model, I agree
with Lawson that the actor must, either explicitly or implicitly, incorpo-
rate into her thinking what I will call a standard of persuasion-a test of
how probable the validity of a proposition must appear for her to treat
the proposition as valid. But then, still remaining within the descriptive
mode, I will introduce some complexities. I will argue that, unless the
actor can make strong simplifying assumptions, she cannot pose her deci-
sion problem in terms of the determination of a single standard of per-
suasion. Lawson is correct to treat the validity of a legal proposition as a
probabilistic matter.27 But the notion of a standard of persuasion-what
he calls a standard of proof-does not always suffice. Instead, it is some-
times necessary, if one wishes to analyze a problem fully, to adopt a more
complex approach to selecting the decision with the greater expected
value.
Section B adds a further variation by examining the prescriptive
mode, in which a legal actor attempts to determine what the law should
be. In this context, descriptive uncertainty as to the state of the law may
still enter into the decision, but it is augmented by uncertainty as to what
the consequences will be of choosing one rule or another. Thus, again,
except in limited circumstances, the court cannot choose a rule of law by
testing alternative candidates against a single standard of persuasion. In-
stead, it must make the more complex determination of what rule opti-
mizes expected value.
A. The Descriptive Mode
L A Simple Mode! Known Facts, Two Possible Legal Rules.-Let
us begin with a simple model. An actor must decide, in a known factual
setting, between two alternative courses of action. The only uncertainty
is what the law is. The actor has no control over what the law is, but
must attempt to discover it. There are only two candidates for the gov-
erning legal rule. If one rule governs, then the actor's interests (broadly
27 Lawson expresses standards of proof in conventional probabilistic terms. Id. at 869. He also
suggests that such standards might be expressed on an ordinal scale, by determining whether a
material proposition is "as or more certain" than some yardstick proposition. Id. at 870. Such an
ordinal scale, referring to levels of certainty, should be considered probabilistic in nature. I believe,
though, that thinking in terms of ordinal probabilities sacrifices valuable information. For example,
in comparing the expected values of two possible decisions, D, and D2, one must take into account
both the consequences of each contingency under each decision and the probability of those contin-
gencies. If the consequences of the first contingency are mildly superior under D, and the conse-
quences of the second contingency are vastly superior under D 2, it becomes important to assess not
only whether the first contingency is superior to the second, but also by how much. See infra note
29.
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defined to include altruistic and social interests recognized by the actor)
will best be served by acting in one way, and if the other rule governs,
those interests will best be served by acting in the other way.
In this setting, the actor faces a simple ordinary case of deciding
under uncertainty, with a two-by-two matrix. The problem has the same
structure as the one she faces in deciding whether to carry an umbrella to
work on a cloudy morning. In that context, there are, simplifying some-
what, two possible relevant states of the world (rain and no rain), and she
can make one of two possible decisions. There are thus four possible
outcomes. Does she carry the umbrella, meaning she will have wasted
effort if the weather stays dry but will be protected if it rains? Or does
she leave the umbrella home, so that her walk will be pleasantly unclut-
tered if it does not rain but quite unpleasant if it does? The decision
depends on the probability that she assigns to rain and the relative value
of each of the four possible outcomes.
Similarly, in the simplified legal setting considered here, there are
two possible decisions the actor can make, and two possible given states
of the world-that is, legal rules. Suppose, for example, the actor's
choices of conduct are ACT-PERMISSIVE and ACT-RESTRICTIVE, and the
rule is either RULE-PERMISSIVE or RULE-RESTRICTIVE. The four possi-
ble outcomes are ACT-PERMISSIVE & RULE-PERMISSIVE, ACT-PERMIS-
SIVE & RULE-RESTRICTIVE, ACT-RESTRICTIVE & RULE-PERMISSIVE,
and ACT-RESTRICTIVE & RULE-RESTRICTIVE. The optimal decision
thus depends on an evaluation of the payoff for each of these four out-
comes,28 and the probabilities of the alternative possible rules of law. Put
another way, the actor should conduct herself in a given way only if she
regards the rule favoring that conduct as having a probability at least as
great as a certain threshold level, and that level will be determined by the
relative payoffs of each of the four possible outcomes.29
If, for example, the actor is a municipal bond lawyer asked to decide
the taxable status of a new offering, she will probably regard as devastat-
ing the consequences of treating the bonds as tax exempt if they are not,
and in substantial part because of this valuation she will probably not act
on the basis that the bonds are exempt unless she is very sure.
If, on the other hand, the actor is a litigator who is contending after
28 The decision depends on an evaluation of the positive as well as the negative outcomes. The
evaluations are relative, so that without loss of generality one outcome may be assigned a unitary
value, thus setting the scale for the others; nevertheless, the remaining three must be evaluated in
relation to that one. For this reason, I prefer not to use the term "regret matrix." A regret matrix is
a simplified form of utility matrix, see RICHARD LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN
APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 162 & n.23 (2d ed. 1982), in which only incorrect decisions are evaluated.
Sometimes this may be a useful simplification, but it is important to remember that all four outcomes
must be evaluated.
29 Here is a simple mathematical model of the problem. The actor can make either of two
decisions, D, or D2. The law is in either of two states, L, or L2. The probability of state L, is pl, and
the probability of state L2 is pb which equals (1 - ps). If the actor selects D, and the law is in state
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the fact that the bonds are exempt and she is deciding whether to argue a
particular proposition of law in her favor, she will probably decide to
make the argument even if it has a relatively low chance of success; the
incremental costs of making the argument are relatively low and the pay-
off, if the argument is correct, is high.
A third actor is the trial judge. Suppose that she is not trying to be
creative but is simply trying to determine "what the law is." Suppose
further that-both for her socially oriented interests and for her desire to
compile a good record in the appellate court-she places the same value
on a correct decision for one party as on a correct decision for the other,
and that the same holds true of incorrect decisions. This judge probably
will select the rule of decision that she believes more likely than not rep-
resents the law.30
2. Multiple Possible Legal Rules.-Now let us complicate the sim-
ple model by relaxing one of its restrictive assumptions, that there are
only two possible legal rules. Lawson correctly recognizes that a deci-
sion in this context cannot depend on selecting the one rule among many
that seem most probably correct.31 Indeed, if the number of possible
legal rules is very large-and if there is a continuous range of possible
rules, the number of individual possible rules is infinite-the probability
of each individual rule will tend to be very small, near zero.
The same problem affects the fact-finding process. There is an infi-
nite number of possible stories that might account for the evidence, each
varying only infinitesimally from some other stories; thus, I have charac-
terized each possible story as being "infinitesimally thin. '32 For exam-
LI, then consequence C,1 follows, if D, and L2, the consequence is C1.2, and so forth. The expected
value of making decision D, is then
(p,)(C,) + (1 - pCI.),
and similarly the expected value of making decision D2 is
(p,)(CZ,) + (I - pl)(CZ2).
D, is the better decision if the expected value of D, is greater than that of D 2, and this will hold if
and only if
pi C 2 - C,2
I - p, C,, - CL1
The fraction on the left-hand side of this inequality represents the odds that state L, is the law. The
numerator of the fraction on the right represents the extent to which, assuming La is the law, the
consequences of decision D 2 are superior to the consequences of decision D1. Similarly, the denomi-
nator of that fraction represents the extent to which, assuming L, is the law, the consequences of D,
are superior to those of D 2.
30 In terms of the mathematical model presented in note 29 supra, the judge regards C1.1 as equal
to C,2 and C1.2 as equal to C,. Thus, the fraction on the right side of the inequality in note 29 equals
1. That is, for D, to be the better decision, the odds that L, is the proper legal rule must be 1 or
greater.
31 Lawson, supra note 1, at 891-92.
32 See Richard D. Friedman, Infinite Strands, Infinitesimally Thin: Story-telling, Bayesianism,
Hearsay and Other Evidence, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 79 (1992).
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pie, a story in which the accused stabbed the victim at one second after 2
p.m., one millimeter below the victim's left ventricle, differs in two re-
spects from a story in which the accused stabbed the victim at two
seconds after 2 p.m., two millimeters below the victim's left ventricle-
but the differences are not great. The fact finder's job cannot be to select
the single most likely story, or even to compare the single most likely
story favoring one party with the single most likely story favoring the
other party.33 Instead, the fact finder must group bunches of infinitesi-
mally thin strands, and then compare these thicker threads together.34
A similar approach might be used by an actor in the descriptive
mode trying to determine which of multiple possible legal rules governs a
known factual situation. Assume as before that only two possible courses
of action, such as ACT-PERMISSIVE and ACT-RESTRICTIVE, are possible.
We may categorize as a permissive rule any possible rule the conse-
quences of which are better, on the known facts, given ACT-PERMISSIVE
than given ACT-RESTRICTIVE. A corresponding categorization would
yield a group of restrictive rules. If, on the known facts, all permissive
rules have the same consequences as each other given either course of
conduct, then we may aggregate these rules, effectively treating them, as
applied to the known facts, as one rule; the restrictive rules may, subject
to the same conditions, be similarly grouped.35
33 Cf Ronald . Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REv. 401, 427 (1986)
(proposing a conceptualization of civil trials that would "requir[e] the parties to assert what they
believe are the most likely sequences of events leading to the event in question and then instructing
the jury to choose between them"); Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOzo L.
REV. 373, 381 (1991) (both parties in civil litigation should be required "to propose equally well
specified cases" and the fact finder should be instructed "to render judgment for the more likely of
the two competing versions of reality offered by the parties").
34 In at least one of his works, Professor Allen appears to have endorsed the idea of individual
stories being aggregated. Allen, A Reconceptualization, supra note 33, at 432-33. I have raised some
questions concerning Allen's treatment of this issue in Infinite Strands, supra note 32, at 93-94 n.40.
35 Extending the model presented in note 29 supra, suppose again that there are two possible
decisions, D, and D2, but that there are n possible rules of law, L, through L,., each with its own
probability pl. The consequence of selecting D, if the rule is L, is C1.1, C1.2 if the rule is L2, and so
forth. The expected value of D, is therefore
PICMt + P2C,2 + -• • + P,.Cl.,
and similarly the expected value of making decision D2 is
p1C2.1 + p2CZ2 + . .. + p.CZ,.
Thus, D, is better than D, if and only if
p(CIJ - C2.1) + P2(C.2 - CZ 2 ) + ... + p.(Cl,, - CZ.) > 0. (*)
Now assume that, for all i between 1 and m inclusive, D, leads to a better result than does D,-that
is, C,,i > C,,. Correspondingly, assume that, for allj between m + 1 and n inclusive, C24 > C1 .
The condition in (*) may be rewritten as
pI(C,1 - CO,1 ) + p2(C 1.2 - C2.) + ... + pM(CI.. -C C2.) >
Pm+I(C2r+l - Clra+I) + Pm+2(C,.+2 -C el..+2) + .- "+ p.,(CZ. - C.,). (**)
Now suppose we can make the aggregating assumption, corresponding to the assumption in the text,
that for all rules L, through L., C1.1 = C.2 = ... C1, = Ci, and C2,, = C,2 = ... = CZ. = C21,
and that for all rules L,+I through L,., Cl.=+I = Cl.m+ 2 =... = C,., = C1,, and Cz=+, = C(Z,+2 =
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This aggregating assumption will sometimes hold true. Suppose
there are two permissive rules-rules that favor a permissive result on
the known facts-but that the rules would draw the dividing line in sub-
stantially different places; the conduct in question would be well within
the realm of tolerable conduct given one rule, but very close to the line
given the other rule. It may be that the actor need not worry about this
difference. That is, it may be that the consequences of the permissive
conduct are the same whichever of these rules is the actual one, and that
the same holds true of the restrictive conduct. For example, the bond
lawyer preparing an issue may conclude that if the bonds are indeed ex-
empt the consequences of her decision-positive if she has decided to
treat them as exempt, negative if she has not-will be the same however
close the legal question may be. The lawyer may take comfort from Jus-
tice Holmes' statement that "the very meaning of a line in the law is that
right and wrong touch each other and that anyone may get as close to the
line as he can if he keeps on the right side."'36
If this appears true in the given case, the lawyer would be able to
aggregate all permissive rules. And if she is also able to aggregate all
restrictive rules (and if all rules are either permissive or restrictive so that
they fit into one aggregation or the other37), then her choice between the
two groups of rules is essentially as easy as in the simple model presented
in section A, in which she chooses between two rules: There are the
... = Cz, = C2,,. Then rules L, through Lm may be grouped together, and so may rules L,=+1
through L.. Let P equal (p, + P2 + . . . + p,), which is the probability of the disjunctive proposi-
tion (L, or L2 or... Lm). This means that (1 - P) equals (pm+, + p,+ 2 + • + pn), and the
expression in (**) may be simplified to
P(CI -- Czj) > (I - P)(C - CIA)
which in turn may be expressed as
P C - C~j
I - P C,,u C J
This inequality is the exact counterpart of the one in note 29 supra. In other words, given the
aggregating assumption, the multiplicity of possible rules does not complicate the problem, once the
two groupings of rules are formed. The circumstances in which D, is the better decision thus may be
expressed in terms of the odds of a single (albeit aggregate, disjunctive) proposition.
If, however, the aggregating assumption cannot be made, we are left with the more complicated
condition in (**). The circumstances in which this condition are satisfied cannot be expressed in
terms of the odds of a single proposition, even an aggregate, disjunctive one.
36 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. United States, 242 U.S. 60, 74 (1916).
37 I am putting aside the possibility of neutral rules, which have the same consequences given
either course of action, for such rules add more complexity than interest to the analysis. A neutral
rule is an example of a rule that does not fit into either of two alternative aggregations of rules, and
so prevents expression of a simple standard of persuasion in terms of the odds of one aggregation, as
in note 35 supra. But because neutral rules do not favor either course of conduct, if the only rules
that do not fit into either of the aggregations are neutral ones, the actor might still express a slightly
altered standard of persuasion, in terms of the probability of one aggregation divided by the
probability of the other aggregation. The sum of those two probabilities would be less than 1 be-
cause of the possibility of neutral rules.
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same four possible outcomes, and the value of those outcomes determines
how probable the permissive group of rules must be before the actor
takes the permissive path.38
But the aggregating assumption will not always hold. An actor may
determine that missing by an inch is not as bad as missing by a mile.
Suppose the actor is the trial court, attempting to determine in the face of
substantial legal uncertainty the legal status of given conduct in which a
defendant, civil or criminal, engaged. The court may decide that the
consequences of incorrectly characterizing the defendant's conduct as il-
legal may be much less if the conduct is close to the line than if it is well
within the realm that the law tolerates. There are at least two reasons for
this.
First, it may be that the distance of the defendant's conduct from
the dividing line reflects the net social benefit of the conduct. Thus, if the
actual legal rule (the one that the court of last resort would apply) would
barely tolerate the defendant's conduct, this may well be because the con-
duct is barely net socially beneficial, or perhaps even net socially detri-
mental. And if that is so, it suggests that the social detriment of
incorrectly penalizing the conduct-putting aside the defendant's reli-
ance interest-is relatively small, if it exists at all.
Second, if the law really is unclear, the extent of the defendant's
reliance interest may depend in part on how far the conduct lies from the
line that the court of last resort would draw, if it were to draw a clear
line. The reliance interest is strong, and the negative consequence of vio-
lating it is great, if that line is such that the defendant's conduct clearly
lies on the good side of it. But if the location of the line is unclear, so
that a fuzzy area exists in which conduct might be on the good side of the
line and might be on the bad side, conduct in that fuzzy area creates a
much weaker reliance interest, even if eventually it is determined that the
conduct does lie on the good side.
Thus, the aggregating assumption does not necessarily hold. When
it does not, the actor cannot treat all permissive rules as a group and all
restrictive rules as another group. And if that treatment is impossible,
then, in deciding whether to take the permissive course or the restrictive
one, the actor cannot pose the issue in terms of how probable the permis-
sive group of rules must be, as compared to the restrictive group, for the
permissive course to be preferable.3 9 That is, in this context it does not
work to speak in terms of a single standard of persuasion for a given legal
proposition, even an aggregated proposition. Instead, the actor must
make a far more complex determination: Taking into account the
probability of each potential rule, and the consequences of that rule (al-
38 For a reasonably simple mathematical demonstration of this point, see supra note 35.
39 The point is presented in mathematical terms in note 35 supra.
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ternatively under one course of action and the other), which course of
action has the greater expected value?
If there is a substantial number of potential rules, this question is
impossible for a human actor to answer without the aid of simplifying
heuristics. Perhaps actors often use the particularly powerful heuristic of
treating all permissive rules as the same and all restrictive rules as the
same.4° That would eliminate the computational complexity nearly alto-
gether and would allow the actor to pose her question in terms of what
standard of persuasion the permissive group of rules must satisfy to make
the permissive course of conduct preferable. But this heuristic would
also disregard much of the complexity of the situation, and so might lead
to results that do not closely reflect the actor's evaluations of the poten-
tial consequences of her actions.
3. Factual Uncertainty, With a Unitary Decisionmaker.-So far in
this Part, I have assumed that the facts have been determined and are
known with certainty by the legal actor, leaving only the law uncertain.
That is a great simplification, of course. Sometimes the legal actor must
act before the facts are determined. In any event, as I have empha-
sized,41 the facts can rarely be determined with anything close to cer-
tainty. The legal actor must therefore take into account not a single
factual setting but a range of possible settings.
Let us first examine the problem assuming that a unitary actor de-
termines both law and fact. If the actor confronts a broad range of both
legal and factual possibilities, she must deal with a very complex matrix.
One rule may favor the permissive conduct only under certain very nar-
row factual settings, another may be slightly more generous, another yet
again slightly more generous, and so forth.
Assume as before that only two possible courses of action, one per-
missive and the other restrictive, are open to the actor. Her task as
before is to select the one that has the higher expected value. She might
first sort into two groups all possible combinations of factual setting and
legal rule-a group of permissive combinations, meaning all those in
which the consequences will be better if the actor chooses the permissive
conduct, and a correspondingly defined group of restrictive combina-
tions. As in subsection 2, in which the actor assumed factual certainty, it
may be that she can make an aggregating assumption:42 If all permissive
combinations of fact and rule have the same consequences as each other
given either the permissive or the restrictive course of conduct, then she
may effectively treat the entire group of combinations as one; the restric-
tive combinations may, subject to the same conditions, be similarly
aggregated.
40 I do not claim to have any psychological insight on this point.
41 See supra Part I and also subsection 2 of this section.
42 See supra text accompanying note 35.
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If this aggregating assumption is correct, then the actor may deter-
mine a level of probability that states how likely it must be that the actual
combination of factual setting and legal rule falls within the permissive
group to make the permissive course of conduct better.43 Note that this
is a standard of persuasion on the combination of factual setting and legal
rule-not on either component taken separately.
Moreover, it may very well be that the aggregating assumption is
not valid. Subsection 2 pointed out problems with that assumption in the
simpler situation in which the factual setting could be taken as a given.
Those problems are likely to become substantially more acute given fac-
tual uncertainty. In particular, it may be that consequences of a course
of conduct that would only be mild given one set of facts near the line
drawn by a plausible legal rule become much stronger given another set
of facts much farther away from that line.
4. Law-determining and Fact-finding Functions Divided.-T his
subsection adds one more complexity to the descriptive mode: The law-
determining and fact-finding functions are divided, so that the trial court
must perform the function of determining what the law is, and the jury
must make the necessary factual findings.
If either the jury or the trial court were perfectly articulate, this
43 The mathematical model presented earlier can be extended to this situation. Assume as before
that there are n possible legal rules Li, with i being an integer between 1 and n inclusive and p, being
the probability that L, is the actual rule. Assume also that there are r possible factual settings Fh,
with h being an integer between 1 and r inclusive and qo being the probability that Fh is the actual
rule. We may treat the q and p terms as independent; what the abstract rule of law is does not
depend on what the actual facts are in the given case. C1.h represents the consequence of selecting
decision D, given legal rule Li and factual setting Fh. The expected value of D, is therefore repre-
sented by this matrix:
plqC*,, + p2qtCz1 + •.. + paqlCll
+ + + ... +
p1q2C1,12 + p 2q2C,,z2 + • + paq 2C,2.
+ + +...+
+ + + ... +
p1qC 1,,, + p2qClar + - + pnqrCI,.r.
A corresponding matrix (but with 2 in place of I as the first subscript of each of the C terms) would
represent the expected value of D2. If the aggregating assumption stated in the text is true, then (1)
for all combinations of legal rule L1 and factual setting Fh for which D, is preferable, (a) C, 5 equals
some constant C1, and (b) C2, equals some constant C2, and (2) for all combinations for which D2 is
preferable, (a) Cgs equals some constant C'1, and (b) C2.h equals some constant C'2 . Now let P equal
the probability that the actual combination of legal rule and factual setting is one for which D, is
preferable. Then it could be shown, by means similar to those used in note 35 supra, but much more
extensive in notation, that the expected value of D, is greater than the expected value of D2 if and
only if
P C'2 - C'I
1 -P C,-C 2
This is the exact counterpart of the final inequalities in notes 29 & 35 supra.
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division would not create much additional complexity. Suppose first that
the jury could articulate just what probability distribution of possible fac-
tual settings it has found. The court's task would then be less complex
than that of the unitary actor in subsection 3, because the fact-finding
aspect of that actor's task would already be performed. Correspond-
ingly, suppose that the court could articulate each possible distribution of
factual possibilities. For each such distribution, the court would then
have to determine the preferable course of action, in the manner sug-
gested in subsection 3. It would then have to articulate to the jury what
result the jury should reach for each distribution of factual possibilities.
The problem, of course, is one highlighted in Part I: Neither judge
nor jury can articulate information disaggregated to such a high degree.
In Part I, I suggested one aspect of a court's likely response to this prob-
lem. The court may, rather than fully articulating the legal standard,
leave to the jury much of the work of transforming general norms into
particularized rules."4
But this leaves unsolved the problem suggested by Lawson: If the
court is uncertain about what the law is, then, to the extent that the court
does articulate the law, what standard should it use for resolving its un-
certainty? I think this problem is probably unsolvable without some
powerful simplifying heuristics.
The court might use an aggregating heuristic similar to the one sug-
gested in subsection 3, assuming that all possible combinations of fact
and rule fall within one of two groups, and that within each group every
combination has the same consequences as every other combination
given either of the two possible results that the adjudication might
achieve. But recall that a heuristic of this type yields a standard of per-
suasion only for a combination of factual setting and legal rule, not for
either component taken separately.
Thus, while this heuristic helps, it does not, except in certain situa-
tions, allow the court to determine how confident it must be in the valid-
ity of a given proposition to act on that proposition as the law. If all the
fact-law combinations that favor one result involve one legal rule and all
the combinations that favor the other result involve the other rule, then
there is really no question of fact at all to be resolved; the court can
assume a given state of facts and determine the governing legal rule in
the manner suggested in subsection 3. Correspondingly, if all the combi-
nations that favor one result involve one factual setting and all the others
involve another, then it does not much matter just what the court be-
lieves the law is; the only question that matters is how the jury resolves
that factual issue.
The case may not be so neat, however. The court might believe, for
example, that, given one plausible combination of factual setting and
44 See supra pp. 923-24.
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legal rule, the restrictive result is preferable, but that given all other com-
binations the permissive result yields better consequences.
If the factual setting that may support the restrictive result seems
likely, the court might simply consider whether, assuming those facts are
true, the restrictive rule is sufficiently probable to make the restrictive
result preferable; if it is, then the court would ask the jury to determine
whether those facts are indeed true. This approach might be practical,
because it first resolves legal uncertainty and then factual uncertainty,
but this also means that the approach avoids some of the complexity of
reality.
Alternatively, one could adjust the standard of persuasion on the
facts: The more confident the court is of the restrictive rule, the less
confident the jury must be that the facts fall within that rule.45 This
would be a rather unusual and unstable use of a standard of persuasion;
it would not be surprising, though, if courts implement something very
much like this sliding scale in determining whether a case should be
presented to the jury at all.
If this all seems quite complex, I do not deny it. But the complexity,
I believe, is not a gratuitous result of the analysis presented here. Rather,
it is the result of a complex situation in which a decision must be based
on both factual and legal perceptions, each of which might in itself be
very complex and uncertain, and the decision making authority is not
unified.
B. The Prescriptive Mode
In section A, I focused on the descriptive mode, in which the legal
standards are determined by someone other than the actor in question.
In this section, I turn to the prescriptive mode, in which the actor-I will
assume that it is a court of last resort-attempts to determine the optimal
state of law.
First, assume that the facts are known. In the descriptive mode, an
actor choosing between alternative courses of conduct has to assign a
probability to each possible legal rule, and determine the consequences
45 Suppose the following: Given legal rule L, and factual setting Ft, the consequences of decision
D, are C, and the consequences of decision D2 are C2, with C, greater than C2. Given all other
combinations of legal rule and factual setting, the consequences of D, are C'!1 and the consequences
of D, are C2', with C'2 greater than C',. The probability of L, is p, and the probability of F, is q1.
Then, by using the condition in note 43 supra, D, is preferable if and only if
plq, C',- C',
I -ptq, C, C
By relatively simple manipulations, this condition may be expressed as
C'2 - C',
q,
pC, - C, + C'2 - C',)
Thus, the greater P, is, the smaller q, need be to make D, the preferable decision.
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for each possible rule of each possible course of conduct. In the prescrip-
tive mode, the court does not have to assign a probability to a given rule;
the court's course of conduct consists of choosing the rule.
This does not mean that uncertainty does not enter into the pre-
scriptive choice of a rule. In fact, as I will now argue, the consequences
of any given possible rule may be very uncertain, and the court must take
this uncertainty into account in selecting a rule. But the eventual ques-
tion that the court must answer is not how probable it is that a given rule
is the law; the court is making the law. And, except under very restric-
tive conditions, the court cannot even pose the question in terms of how
probable it is that a given rule is the best rule. Instead, the court must
ask which rule has the greatest expected value.46
The consequences of a given rule may be uncertain, even assuming
certainty as to the facts of the particular case, in at least two respects.
Most obviously, the court may be uncertain how the rule would actually
affect interests or conduct outside the courtroom.47 Another aspect of
uncertainty may stem from an element of description that might enter
into the prescriptive decision. The court may believe that norms previ-
ously established-perhaps by constitutional, statutory, or regulatory
text, or by judicial precedent, or even by natural law-prescribe a rule of
decision, or a range of rules of decision, for the case. If so, the court
probably will assign some positive value, not necessarily dispositive, to
deciding in accordance with those norms. But the court may, like the
actors discussed in section A, be uncertain just what those rules are.
However the uncertainty of the consequences of a rule may arise,
the court must take that uncertainty into account in evaluating the rule.
Suppose, to take a simple case, that the court's choice is simply between
two rules,48 and that there is just one uncertain contingency, which has
two possible states, termed affirmative and negative. Given the affirma-
tive state, one rule is better, and given the negative state the second rule
is preferable. In such a case, the court might easily determine how prob-
able the affirmative state must be to make the first rule preferable. 49
Usually, however, the world is not that simple. One problem, of
course, is that there may be many candidates, not just two, for the legal
46 I put aside in this analysis, as I have throughout this Essay, the difficulty of measuring differ-
ent consequences that may appear to be incommensurable. That, of course, is a very serious diffi-
culty, but it is beyond the scope of this Essay.
47 The uncertainty may arise from uncertainty as to some aspect of the state of the world that is
not involved in the particular case, or that has ramifications for application of the rule beyond that
case; in traditional terms, the court may be uncertain about material legislative facts. The distinction
between adjudicative and legislative facts is addressed briefly in note 22 supra.
48 A somewhat looser assumption would be that the choice is between two groups of rules, all
the members of each group having identical consequences, at least so far as is apparent from the case
at hand.
49 Suppose the probability of the affirmative state of the contingency is Pl, that the consequence
of selecting legal rule L, is C1.1 given the affirmative state and C1.2 given the negative state, and that
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rule. Even if just one contingency affects the expected value of each rule,
it seems a singularly inefficient approach to determine for each rule-to-
rule comparison the probability of the contingency that would make the
first rule preferable, and then determine whether the probability is above
that threshold. It is better to assess the probability of the contingency
and determine which rule, given that probability, has the greatest ex-
pected value.
Moreover, there will usually be more than one contingency that af-
fects the expected value of some, or all, of the possible rules. Those con-
tingencies will probably affect the value of the rules to different extents;
furthermore, the consequences of various combinations of contingencies
may not be a simple addition of the consequences of the individual con-
tingencies. Thus, multiple contingencies cannot usually be aggregated
and treated as one contingency. There may be numerous circum-
stances-numerous combinations of probabilities of the various contin-
gencies-that might make one rule preferable to another. Therefore, one
cannot express the choice between rules in terms of the threshold
probability of a single contingency or aggregated group of contingencies.
Instead, the court must assess the likelihood of each contingency and the
value of each possible rule under each contingency.
In other words, if the situation entails even a fair amount of com-
plexity, there is no substitute for the bottom-line determination of which
rule has the greatest expected value. I certainly agree with Lawson that
selection of that optimal rule requires taking uncetainty into account.
But, unlike him, I do not believe that the court's conclusion should usu-
ally be phrased in terms such as, "We believe that it is at least x% prob-
able that this rule is the best."150 Instead, the court should say, in effect,
the consequence of selecting legal rule L2 is C , given the affirmative state and C2 given the negative
state. The expected value of selecting L1 is then
(p 1,),) + (1 - p,)(c,.2,
and similarly the expected value of selecting L2 is
(p1)(C41) + (1 - p,)C,).
These are exactly the same expressions of expected value as in note 29 supra, and so the conditions in
which L, is preferable may be expressed in the same terms:
I - p, C1.1 - C41
This congruence is not surprising. In the simple model, presented in note 29 supra, of decision
making by an actor in the descriptive mode, the actor had to choose between two available courses of
action given a contingency-the legal rule-that had two possible legal states. In the model
presented here, the actor must choose between two available legal rules given some other contin-
gency that has two possible states. The problems facing the actor in the two situations are therefore
analytically similar, though the symbols have somewhat different meanings in the two models.
50 This is a statement of cardinal probability. Lawson would also allow standards of persuasion
to be expressed on an ordinal scale, but such expressions would still be probabilistic in nature. See
supra note 27.
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"Taking into account all possible contingencies, and the probabilities of
those contingencies, we believe that this rule is the best."
III. THE STANDARD OF PERSUASION IN DETERMINING THE
ELEMENTS OF A CRIME
In this Part, I will narrow my focus from the generalities that have
dominated Parts I and II and offer some tentative thoughts on an inter-
esting conundrum that Lawson poses. A criminal defendant cannot be
convicted constitutionally unless the fact finder concludes that, for each
of the elements of the crime, facts constituting that element are proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. This requirement reflects the fundamental
and longstanding view that the negative consequences of an incorrect
conviction are so great that they dwarf in magnitude the consequences of
the other three possibilities-a correct conviction, a correct acquittal,
and an incorrect acquittal.5 1 But, then, what about legal uncertainty?
Suppose, to simplify matters somewhat, that the relevant facts are stipu-
lated, or otherwise admit of no substantial uncertainty, but that the ap-
plicable legal standard is uncertain. Should conviction be deemed proper
even if the court is not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the
legal standard is broad enough to include the given facts? To the extent,
if any, that the answer is affirmative, why should courts treat legal uncer-
tainty differently from factual uncertainty?
First, let us focus on the descriptive mode. Again for simplicity,
assume that only one element of the crime is in question. Also for sim-
plicity, assume that there are only two candidates for the definition of the
element, one permissive and the other restrictive. (Alternatively, if there
are more than two candidates, assume that they may be aggregated into
two groups in the manner discussed in Part II, with each group being
treated essentially as one definition. 52) For the trial court to act in ac-
cordance with the restrictive definition, the one that would yield a con-
viction, how sure must the court be that this is descriptively correct?
This strikes me as quite a difficult question. On the one hand, mis-
takenly branding an accused as a criminal is not clearly worse when the
mistake lies in determining that the accused did something he did not in
fact do than when the mistake lies in determining incorrectly that what
the accused concededly did was criminal conduct. Either case yields the
detested result of convicting the accused even though his conduct lay
outside the realm proscribed by the law. For the accused, the two types
of errors have the same effect; for future cases, the error of law is more
dangerous.
51 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 358 (18th ed.
1829) ("[The law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer.").
52 See supra note 43 and text accompanying notes 42-43.
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At the same time, however, it seems impractical to insist that the
legal proposition supporting conviction be descriptively accurate beyond
a reasonable doubt. Often the law is very open-textured, or fuzzy; there
may be no precedents on point or even close. Thus, even though the trial
court has some confidence that a given proposition of law is descriptively
accurate, it may be unable to say, no matter how exhaustive an inquiry it
makes, that the proposition is accurate beyond a reasonable doubt. One
problem confronting the trial court may be that the law governing the
case, if litigated to the end, would be whatever the court of last resort
determined prescriptively to be the better rule, and the trial judge may
not have perfect insight into the psychology of the judges on the high
court.53 It seems intolerable to say that in all such cases the trial court
ought to enter a judgment of acquittal, preserving the possibility of ap-
peal by the prosecution and eventual conviction only, if at all, by with-
holding the judgment until the facts are determined.
Indeed, it appears to me that if the facts are determined against the
accused and the trial court is reasonably confident-it is hopeless to at-
tempt to quantify this standard-that the legal standard necessary to up-
hold the conviction is descriptively accurate, the court ought usually to
enter the conviction, leaving it to the accused to appeal. Even if it is true
that final conviction because of legal error is as bad as final conviction
because of factual error, the same is not true of the initial entry of judg-
ment. An error of law in the trial court is less dangerous because it can
be corrected more easily.
The trial court should not rely, however, on the appeals process to
correct errors that easily might have been prevented below. Perhaps,
therefore, the trial court ought to supplement its "reasonable confidence"
standard with an inquiry meant to preserve any reliance interest of the
accused, just in case this is not an instance of a fuzzy law: As a prerequi-
site to entering a judgement of conviction, the court must be persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt that, assuming it made an exhaustive inquiry
and analyzed the relevant materials correctly, it would not find that the
permissive rule contended for by the accused is clearly a descriptively
accurate statement of law.
In the hard cases, though, in which the law has not crystallized, the
important work must be done by the courts that make the law-that is,
by courts that act prescriptively. Suppose, then, that the trial court has
entered a conviction on stipulated facts and that the accused has ap-
pealed to the court of last resort.
Prescriptive as that court may be, part of its function will still be
descriptive. If the law has crystallized in the accused's favor, the defend-
53 See, eg., A.P. (SIR ALAN PATRICK) HERBERT, STILL MORE MISLEADING CASES 118-24
(1933) (young barrister arguing, without success, that a decision of the House of Lords ought to be
deemed "in the nature of an Act of God" because it was "something which no reasonable man could
have expected").
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ant will have a strong reliance interest against a retroactive expansion of
the zone of criminal conduct. Even if the law has not crystallized, the
court might be attempting in part to transform previously determined
general norms into operational particular rules of law. To the extent this
is the court's function, the court should weigh very heavily the danger of
branding the accused's conduct as criminal even though it lies outside the
area covered by those norms. Thus, the principle of lenity in construc-
tion of criminal statutes should have significant force.54
Part of the court's task, though, will be purely prescriptive, to deter-
mine what the guiding norms should be. To the extent the court (or, for
that matter, the legislature) is engaged purely in prescription, the court's
chief concern in the descriptive mode-that it will wrongly brand the
accused as a criminal even though under a descriptively accurate state-
ment of the law his conduct was lawful-simply disappears. In the pre-
scriptive mode, we may still speak of correct and incorrect decisions, if
we wish, but the terms have different meaning; an incorrect decision
against the accused, for example, is one that categorizes the conduct as
criminal even though under a preferable norm the conduct would be
deemed innocent. In this sense, the negative value of an incorrect deci-
sion against the accused is not clearly greater in magnitude than that of
an incorrect decision in his favor. Nor is the positive value of a correct
decision against the accused (one that accurately reflects preferred
norms) clearly less than that of a correct decision in his favor.
Indeed, in some cases the court might well determine that a broad,
prophylactic criminal prohibition is preferable. It may be far better to
treat some conduct as criminal, even though that conduct seems on bal-
ance to be harmless or even net socially beneficial. It may be, for exam-
ple, that, although the court believes the conduct is net beneficial, the
court is risk averse and recognizes a plausible possibility that the conduct
is actually quite devastating; assuming that most people will comply with
the law, the principal downside of an overly broad definition of criminal
conduct might be to inhibit some activity that would be tolerable or even
beneficial, but the downside of an overly narrow definition might be to
tolerate activity that causes grievous harm. Or we may prefer, for pur-
poses of simplifying the rules of criminal law, to use a bright line rule
drawn well away from the fuzzier line that divides beneficial and detri-
mental conduct. Or it may be that law enforcement officials would have
so much more trouble detecting violations of a narrow proscription that
the broader proscription is favorable.
If we relax one of the simplifying assumptions I have imposed,
under which there are only two candidates for the applicable legal rule,
the point is even stronger. A full and-delicate palette of shadings in word
choice is available for the expression of rules. Suppose, therefore, that
54 See Lawson, supra note 1, at 888.
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the court, perhaps in attempting to set out a standard that will govern in
varying factual settings, is choosing from among a wide range of possible
rules, each only infinitesimally different from some of the others. Given
this range of choice, it does not appear possible for the court to insist that
it will choose one rule over its more permissive neighbor only if it is
persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the first rule is preferable.
The court is engaged in an optimizing task, and as it nears its decision it
will likely have to select among standards that are very close together.
Ideally, the court should feel that the standard it selects is preferable
both to one a little more restrictive and to one a little more permissive,
but the differences may not be dramatic or clear.
I have also conveniently pushed aside until now one other complex-
ity raised by the discussion in Part I. Confronting it requires a return to
the trial court. If, as I have contended, part of the prescription of stan-
dards controlling a particular case is actually performed by the jury,55
does that mean that the jury should not convict unless it is persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt of the validity of the standards it would pre-
scribe against the accused? Perhaps, to the extent that the task of pre-
scription is left to the jurors, they should approach it in the same way
that the court of last resort does. And perhaps that in fact is what they
do. Indeed, perhaps that is inevitably what they must do; to the extent
that the jurors are engaged purely in prescription, they, no less than the
court of last resort, may have to select the optimum standard from a
range of possibilities, and that is a task that ordinarily does not allow
decisions leaving no reasonable doubt.
Even if these musings are correct, I am not sure that they have
much operational significance. The courts leave a law-defining function
to the jury in large part, I have argued in Part I, because of limits on
articulation. Courts, not to mention juries, are often uncertain to what
extent the jury is finding facts and to what extent the jury is determining
legal standards. It will hardly do, therefore, to enunciate an instruction
like the following:
To the extent you are determining facts, you may not find the accused
guilty unless you find that facts necessary to support each element of the
crime are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent you are deter-
mining the governing standard of behavior, you should not reach a verdict
of guilty under any standard unless you are confident beyond a reasonable
doubt that the standard is within the general limits of the law that I have
outlined for you, but within those limits you should select the standard that
in your view optimizes what you deem to be the various interests at stake.
Some things are better left unsaid.
55 See supra pp. 923-24.
86:916 (1992)
HeinOnline  -- 86 Nw. U. L. Rev.  941 1991-1992
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Lawson has made a substantial contribution by presenting
the question of standards of persuasion on propositions of law. My over-
all conclusion is that the matter is very complex, perhaps far more than
Lawson recognized, and that in some circumstances one cannot even
speak meaningfully of a standard of persuasion; instead, one must ask the
substantially more inclusive, and more complex, bottom-line question of
what course of conduct has the greatest expected value. Implementation
of a carefully articulated approach to that question, it seems to me, is not
usually possible in the real world. We may be more comfortable, there-
fore, returning the entire matter to the closet that Lawson has dared to
open. But for the sake of full understanding it is better that the problem
be unveiled, and we should shed as much light on it as we can.
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